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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CORPORATIONS, FIDUCIARIES, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Challenging a liquidator's I purchase of property belong-
ing to the corporation being liquidated, plaintiff, a minority
shareholder, alleged that the liquidator had breached his
fiduciary duties by paying an inadequate price for the prop-
erty and by manipulating both the plaintiffs stock and the
corporation's assets to his own advantage. Plaintiff brought
an action to rescind the sale with an alternative demand for
damages. In reversing a dismissal by the trial court and an
order of rescission by the court of appeal,2 the Louisiana
Supreme Court awarded damages and held that a liquidator
who acquires the liquidated corporation's property has the
burden of proving that the transaction was fair and at arm's
length when made. Noe v. Roussel, 310 So. 2d 806 (La. 1975).
Liquidators, by replacing corporate directors,3 acquire
the fiduciary obligations imposed upon corporate officers and
directors. 4 Courts have always been suspicious of an agent
contracting both for himself and for his principal;5 histori-
1. Roussel, the liquidator, owned 99% of the stock of American Benefit
Life Ins. Co., which purchased the property. The Louisiana Supreme Court
stated, however, that "Roussel is American .... [A] wholly owned corpora-
tion is the alter ego of the party owning the corporation, and . . . in such
instances, the corporate veil may be pierced." Noe v. Roussel, 310 So. 2d 806,
826 (La. 1975) (emphasis added). Thus, Roussel and American were solidarily
liable for any damages Roussel caused. Although the facts of the instant case
justify finding the corporation to be Roussel's alter ego, Louisiana courts
have not found similarly in all matters involving wholly owned corporations.
See, e.g., Texas Industries, Inc. v. Dupuy & Dupuy Dev., Inc., 227 So. 2d 265
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1969) (stating that the doctrine of alter ego applies only
when the separate individualities of the corporation and its stockholder have
ceased to exist).
2. Noe v. Roussel, 299 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
3. LA. R.S. 12:141(c) (Supp. 1968) provides: "[W]hen the [liquidation] pro-
ceeding takes effect ... all the rights, powers and duties of the officers and
board of directors . . . shall be vested in the liquidator ... and the authority
and duties of the officers and directors of the corporation shall cease. .. ."
4. LA. R.S. 12:145(G) (Supp. 1968) provides: "In the performance of his
duties, each liquidator shall be bound to exercise that care and prudence in
the listing, custody, possession, control and disposition of the property and
moneys of the corporation coming into his hands, and in the proper account-
ing therefor, and distribution thereof, as by law is imposed upon fiduciaries."
LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968) provides: "Officers and directors shall be deemed
to stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its shareholders
and shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith, and
with that diligence, care, judgment and skill which ordinary prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in like position .. "
5. E.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S.
503, 560 (1846).
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cally, most jurisdictions considered the resultant contracts at
least voidable by the principal, notwithstanding the fairness
of the transaction.6 Eventually, however, inherent fairness
became the test for determining the validity of such transac-
tions, with courts upholding a contract benefitting a fiduciary
upon finding it just and reasonable and holding it voidable
otherwise. 7 In deciding which party has the burden of prov-
ing the fairness or unfairness of the transaction, Louisiana
courts, in accord with the principles behind the prior stan-
dard forbidding such contracts and following the rule in other
jurisdictions, have placed the burden of proof upon the party
seeking to uphold the transaction.8
Recently, a number of states have enacted statutes deal-
ing with the problems of self-dealing, which generally provide
criteria for determining the validity of transactions between
directors and their corporations.9 For example, section 84 of
the Louisiana Business Corporation Law10 provides:
A. No . . . transaction between a corporation and ...
its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any
other business . .. or . . . corporation ... in which one or
more of its directors of officers are directors or officers or
6. See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 THE Bus. LAWYER 35 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Marsh]. See, e.g., R. POTHIER, TRAITE DU CONTRAT DE
VENTE, pt. 1, n ° 13 (1806): "Nous ne pouvons acheter, ni par nous-m~mes, ni
par personnes interpos~es, les choses que font parties des biens dont nous
avons l'administration; ainsi un tuteur ne peut acheter les choses qui appar-
tiennent i son mineur; un administrateur ne peut acheter aucune chose de
bien dont il a l'administration ... "
7. Marsh at 43.
8. E.g., House of Campbell v. Campbell, 172 So. 2d 727, 730 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1965) ("the director has the burden of proof of fairness to the corporation
and that he was acting in good faith"). See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921);
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d
66 (1952).
9. CAL CORP. CODE § 820 (1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. 33-323 (1959); DEL.
CODE 8:144 (1969); GA. CODE 22:716 (1968); IND. STAT. 23-1-10-6 (1969); KAN.
STAT. 17-6304 (1972); KY. R.S. 271A.205 (1972); LA. R.S. 12:84 (Supp. 1968); ME.
R.S. 13A:717 (1971); MICH. STAT. 15:21.200(545) (1973); NEB. R.S. 21-2040.01
(1972); NEV. R.S. 78.140 (1969); N.J. STAT. 14A:6-8 (1968); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 713 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. 55-30 (1955); PA. STAT. 15:1409.1 (1968); R.I.
GEN. LAWS 7-1.1-37.1 (1969); S.C. CODE 12-18.16 (1962); TENN. CODE 48-816
(1968); VA. CODE 13:1-39.1 (1975); W. VA. CODE 31-1-97 (1974); WIS. STAT.
180.355 (1972). MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 41 (1969) served as the model for
most of the statutes.
10. LA. R.S. 12:84 (Supp. 1968).
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have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely
for this reason . . . if:
(1) The material facts as to his interest and as to the
contract or transaction were disclosed or known to the
board of directors or the committee, and the board or
committee in good faith authorized the contract or trans-
action by a vote sufficient for such purpose without count-
ing the vote of the interested director or directors; or
(2) The material facts as to his interest and as to the
contract or transaction were disclosed or known to the
shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or
transaction was approved in good faith by vote of the
shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction was fair as to the
corporation as of the time it was authorized, approved or
ratified by the board of directors, committee, or sharehold-
ers ....
The comments to the corresponding provision in the Model
Business Corporation Act,11 which section 84 closely follows,
reveal an intent to modify the strict judicial scrutiny for-
merly given such transactions by "validat[ing], if the pre-
scribed tests are satisfied, transactions with interested direc-
tors which common law rules often make voidable if not
void."'12
Despite the comments accompanying the Model Act,
questions have arisen whether and to what extent a more
lenient standard has actually been enacted. Some commen-
tators, citing the lack of specification in typical state statutes
concerning which party bears the burden of proving whether
the tests have been met, have wondered if the leniency has
gone as far as shifting the burden of showing unfair dealing
to the plaintiff.13 Furthermore, although the Model Act and
those statutes based upon it are written in the disjunctive,
indicating only one of the three conditions need be met to
uphold the transaction, debate continues on whether disclo-
sure of the conflict accompanied by stockholder or director
approval is alone adequate, or whether the transaction need
always be proved fair. 14
11. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 41 (1969).
12. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d at 842 (1971).
13. Kessler, The N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, 36 ST. JOHN L. REV. 1, 74-77 (1961);
Note, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 840, 842 (1967).
14. Compare Canard, An Overview of the Laws of Corporation, 71 MICH.
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In the .instant case, the corporate liquidator acted in bad
faith 5 by manipulating the minority shareholder's stock and
paid an inadequate price for the property he purchased from
the corporation. 16 The Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized
that a liquidator's fiduciary obligation extends not only to the
corporation, but also to the individual stockholders;' 7 addi-
tionally, the court held the liquidator to the standards re-
quired of a corporate director, whom he replaces, when deal-
ing with the corporation. 8 In construing section 84 of the
Louisiana Corporation Law, the court concluded that an in-
terested liquidator bears the burden of proving the fairness
and impartiality of any transaction he conducts with the cor-
poration.19 The court went beyond the facts of the instant
case to state that any agent or other person acting in a
fiduciary capacity who acquires his principal's property bears
the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction. In
describing the extent of that burden, the court said:
L. REV. 623, 653-54 (1973) (arguing that judges must continue to require a fair
transaction, especially in light of stockholder giveaways) with Note, 16 BUFF.
L. REV. 840, 845 (1967) (supporting a more lenient provision allowing for
validity of transaction involving interested directors upon full disclosure and
independent approval, notwithstanding unfairness). See also Remillard Brick
Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952) in
which the court said that "neither section 820 of the Corporations Code nor
any other provision of the law automatically validates such transactions
simply because there has been a disclosure and approval by the majority of
the stockholders .... Even though the requirements of section 820 are
technically met, transactions that are unfair and unreasonable to the corpo-
ration may be avoided." See Marsh at 74 for a proposed amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to forbid any corporate transaction with an
affiliated person.
15. The liquidator arranged for plaintiff's stock to be listed in the name
of another person, without plaintiff's consent, called all of plaintiffs pre-
ferred stock the day after suit was filed, and, in his attempt to sell the
corporate assets, used an advertisement the court determined was "[t]o say
the least . . . misleading." 310 So. 2d at 819.
16. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court treated Roussel, the
liquidator, as the purchaser, American Benefit Life Ins. Co., his alter ego,
was the actual vendee.
17. Under LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968), corporate directors owe fiduciary
duties to the stockholders. LA. R.S. 12:145(G) (Supp. 1968) does not specifically
extend fiduciary obligations from liquidators to stockholders, but because the
court analogizes their responsibility to that of corporate officers, liquidators
are now also subject to individual shareholder action in addition to deriva-
tive actions under LA. R.S. 12:42 (Supp. 1968).
18. 310 So. 2d at 816.
19. Id. at 818-19.
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[such a person] bears the burden of establishipg that the
transaction was an arm's length affair. This means that
the agent or fiduciary must handle the matter as though
it were his own affair. It also means the agent or
fiduciary may not take even the slightest advantage, but
must zealously, diligently and honestly guard and cham-
pion the rights of his principal against all other persons
whomsoever, and is bound not to act in antagonism, op-
position or conflict with the interest of the principal to
even the slightest extent.
20
By placing the burden of proving the fairness of the
transaction upon the fiduciary, 21 Louisiana adheres to the
traditional rule grounded upon the suspicions inevitably
aroused by transactions in which those exercising the serious
responsibility of fiduciaries act also for their own benefit. The
court did not rely upon section 84 which, along with the
similar statutes of other states, fails to indicate who bears
the burden when corporate self-dealing is challenged; rather,
the court looked to prior jurisprudence 22 finding such trans-
actions marked with a presumption of fraud. Although re-
quiring the party seeking to uphold such a transaction to
dispel the doubts which naturally exist is not a novel result,23
realization that placement of the burden of proof frequently
determines the outcome in cases involving complex factual
situations emphasizes the importance of the court's clarifica-
tion of the evidentiary issue.
Further importance of Noe lies in the court's strong indi-
cation in the decision that Louisiana has rejected the ten-
dency of its sister states to adopt more lenient policies con-
cerning conflicts of interest, 24 evidenced by the extensive ob-
20. Id.
21. Although the plaintiff in this case showed conduct by the defendant
in violation of his fiduciary responsibilities, the court clearly indicated that
the plaintiff need not have done this, since the burden was upon the fiduciary
to refute the presumption of fraud which was automatically raised by the
conflict of interest. 310 So. 2d at 818. See, e.g., Cuggy v. Zeller, 132 La. 222, 61
So. 209 (1913).
22. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co.,
133 U.S. 50 (1890); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616 (1874); Michoud v. Girod, 45
U.S. 503 (1846); Assunto v. Coleman, 158 La. 537, 104 So. 318 (1925); Cuggy v.
Zeller, 132 La. 222, 61 So. 209 (1913); House of Campbell v. Campbell, 172 So.
2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
23. See cases cited in H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 2D ED. 467 n.8
(1965).
24. See text at note 12, supra. Several legislatures which adopted stat-
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ligations the court places upon corporate fiduciaries. Liken-
ing the liquidator's responsibilities to those of corporate
officers and directors, the court cites section 84 as support for
its delineation of those obligations. 25 Without mentioning the
statute's disjunctive form, which seemingly grants appoval if
the transaction meets the test of either fairness or full disclo-
sure accompanied by independent approval, Noe requires
fairness in all cases, notwithstanding full disclosure, in addi-
tion to an arm's length deal.26
Justification for the court's construction of the statute
might lie in the part of section 84 which provides that the
relevant transaction is not void or voidable solely because it
involves a fiduciary acting both for himself and for his princi-
pal if one of the enumerated tests is satisfied. Even if one, or
all, of those tests are met, the transaction might still be
voidable for another reason-the most likely being a violation
of the fiduciary's obligation to act in good faith. 27 In so decid-
ing, Louisiana becomes part of a distinct minority, California
being the only other state to have similarly held that, in
conflict of interest cases, provisions such as section 84 only
supplement, rather than replace, the overriding fiduciary ob-
ligation imposed upon directors and liquidators. 28
utes similar to LA. R.S. 12:84 (Supp. 1968) apparently had the intention of
adopting a more lenient rule than that which developed under their respec-
tive jurisprudence. MIcH. STAT. ANN. 15:21.200 (545) Revision Comment
(1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:6-8 Commissioners' Comment (1968); 6 MCKIN-
NEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF N.Y. ANN. at 639, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713,
Legislative Studies & Reports (1963).
25. 310 So. 2d at 817.
26. Although one might suppose that full disclosure accompanied by
independent approval would satisfy the arm's length requirement, the
California appellate court in Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.,
109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952), states that it would not, as the
fiduciary must also prove that he acted in good faith. The Louisiana Supreme
Court seems to agree when it requires that the fiduciary prove he zealously
championed the rights of his principal and did not act in conflict with the
interest of the principal to even the slightest extent.
27. LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968); LA. R.S. 12:145(G) (Supp. 1968).
28. See CAL. CORP. CODE 820 which includes the director's obligation to
act in good faith. In Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal.
App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952), the California appellate court relied upon this
obligation and upon the statement that a transaction with an interested
director is not void or voidable solely because of the conflict of interest. The
court said: "It would be a shocking concept of corporate morality to hold that
because the majority directors or stockholders disclose their purpose and
interest, they may strip a corporation of its assets to their own financial
advantage, and that the minority is without legal redress." 109 Cal. App. 2d
at 418-19, 241 P.2d at 74.
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Thus the Louisiana Supreme Court clarifies section 84 by
indicating that disclosure accompanied by independent ap-
proval is not enough: the fiduciary must also act in good faith
and in a fair manner. The court describes the standard of
care as that of an agent handling his own affairs. 29 Left
unanswered, however, are questions of how future courts will
apply the Noe standard to different situations, particularly
those in which an interested fiduciary pays or charges a fair
price but does so with a selfish motive. For example, if a
director were involved in a competing business and, seeking
to stifle competition, purchased the principal corporate as-
sets, he would clearly violate his obligation to act at arm's
length. Similarly, he would violate the Noe standard if he sold
to the corporation at a fair price something unnecessary. In
each situation a stockholder may be harmed because the cor-
poration no longer has the assets upon which he relied or is
not being operated in the manner he expected, but he still
may have difficulty proving actual monetary damages. Noe
suggests that rescission would ordinarily be the proper rem-
edy for such a violation of the arm's-length test,30 irrespective
of whether the price was fair, the conflict disclosed, or the
transaction approved, unless the interested fiduciary could
29. 310 So. 2d at 818-19. However, LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968), upon which
the court relies, uses the test of a prudent man under similar circumstances
in like positions. There is a split among jurisdictions on whether to use the
standard of an "ordinary man" or of an "ordinary director." H. HENN, LAW
OF CORPORATIONs 2D ED. at 454-55 (1965).
30. The Louisiana Supreme Court quoted Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939), in which the United States Supreme Court said: "The essence of the
test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the
earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not, equity will set it aside."
308 U.S. at 306. The Louisiana Supreme Court implies that an arm's length
deal is something more than a fair deal-it encompasses the motive and
degree of good faith of the fiduciary. Since the defendant extensively violated
his duty to act in good faith, even if the price he paid had been fair, the
plaintiff may still have had an action under LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968) (see
note 4, supra) and under the standard of care required of fiduciaries as
announced by Noe. The court did not rescind the sale, however, since the
property had been transferred to a "third party in good faith" prior to the
filing of a lis pendens by plaintiff. Hoping to protect the public records
doctrine, numerous banking, financial, and commercial institutions filed
amicus curiae briefs urging the Supreme Court to overrule the court of
appeal, which had rescinded the sale notwithstanding the transfer to the
third party. They reasoned that even though the transferee was a subsidiary
of American Benefit Life Ins. Co., the liquidator's alter ego, the court should
not pierce the corporate veil since the transferee was a non-litigant and had
purchased the property without notice of the pending action.
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meet the heavy burden of proving that he acted without any
selfish motive or conflict of interest to even the slightest
extent. 31Allowing such wronged minority stockholders a rem-
edy is not objectionable; however, applying the burden of
proof rule in Noe might have the effect of precluding transac-
tions by interested directors altogether, a policy most juris-
dictions abandoned years ago.
Ambiguity in the existing Louisiana statutes provides
some support for the court's rejection of the more lenient
rules concerning conflicts of interest and adoption of a
perhaps too stringent standard. Thus perhaps the legislature
should consider amending section 84 to clearly state that a
director must always act in good faith and that he must
always pay or charge a fair price in any transaction he con-
ducts with the corporation. 32 Additionally, codification of the
Noe burden concerning proof of compliance with the statu-
tory tests could be joined with a provision which would enable
a director to relieve himself of that burden, shifting it to the
party challenging the transaction, if, in advance, he fully
discloses his conflict of interest and obtains independent ap-
proval of the proposed transaction from either the stockhold-
ers or from the board of directors. 33 Such a statute would
clearly protect minority shareholders, and concurrently, re-
lieve directors and liquidators of the unjustiflably heavy bur-
den now placed upon them.
Steven J. Willis
31. The court does not explain how a fiduciary can act both for himself
and for his principal without having a conflict of interest.
32. Such an amendment would incorporate the requirements of section
84(A)(3), the fairness test, and of section 91 of the Louisiana Corporation
Law, which establishes the general fiduciary obligation, making them of
overriding importance.
33. Thus amended, the statute would retain sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of
LA. R.S. 12:84 (Supp. 1968), which provide for full disclosure of the conflict
and independent approval, and make them significant only to the placement
of the burden of proof, rather than to the ultimate validity of the transaction.
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